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Executive Summary
There continues to be widespread criticism of the extension of patent rights
on pharmaceuticals in the developing world asrequired by World Trade Orga-
nization membership. This chapter examines arguments in favor and against
this strengthening of worldwide patent protection. It emphasizes that these
new pharmaceutical patents promise benefits and costs thatdiffer according
to the characteristics of diseases. Some diseases primarily affect poor countries.
For these diseases, patents will not be sufficient to attract substantial private
investment, because purchasing power is low. However, globally availableand
well-defined patent rights could increase the benefits derived from greater
public financing of research on pharmaceutical products for the developing
world. For major global diseases the justification for extending patents in
poorer countries is less clear. Thus the optimal globalframework for pharma-
ceutical patents might require differentiating the protection given to products
in accordance with their extremely different global markets. The chapter con-
siders standard intellectual property and regulatory mechanisms that could be
used to differentiate protection. All have serious drawbacks. It then describes
a new mechanism that would make differentiatingprotection a more feasible
policy option.
I.Introduction
Recent agreements involving intellectual property will result in a sig-
nificant extension in the global patent rights available to pharmaceuti-
cal firms. At the close of the Uruguay round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, membersagreed to a common set
of international rules against a background of long-running bilateral
pressure on selected developing countries tostrengthen their patent
laws.' Many developing countries have excluded pharmaceutical inno-
vations from patent protection, offering only very brief protection for92 Lanjouw
new manufacturing processes. Now all members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are expected to implement new laws that look
very much like those in the U.S. and Europe, if they have not done so
already.2
The implications of this expansion of rights, and the question of
whether the global framework for intellectual property is now appro-
priate, have been sources of continuing, often intense disagreement.
The initial debate in the context of the GAIT negotiations revolved
around whether intellectual property was even a legitimate subject for
a trade treaty. Those in favor of its inclusion finally prevailed in the
form of the TRIPS component of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property,
Annex 1C). The issue was reawakened as the public became more
aware of the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, together with the discovery
of expensive patented drugs to treat the disease. Today there continues
to be widespread criticism of the international framework for patent
rights laid down in TRIPS as it applies to pharmaceuticals. Views in
the developing world range from uneasy acceptance to outright rejec-
tion, and the potential effect of the new regime on health in these coun-
tries has also raised active concern elsewhere.3
It is important that the divergent interests involved in this debate
arrive at a more broadly acceptable system. The simple fact that the
TRIPS-based global architecture has generated such resistance is dam-
aging in a variety of ways. Pressure groups are driving changes to the
system of patent rights and using targeted campaigns to lower particu-
lar drug prices. Regardless of the merits of individual results, this is a
process of change that is both costly and extremely unpredictable in
its effect. The uncertainty this creates about future markets and pricing
opportunities is itself a strong deterrent to private sector involvement
in drug research for the developing world. Dissatisfaction with the pat-
ent system in the realm of health may also spill over into a distrust of
the intellectual property system more generally. This possibility should
concern anyone who considers patents to be an important stimulus to
innovative effort. Finally, regardless of what treaties are signed and
laws passed in the poorer countries, reliable and consistent patent sys-
tems there can only be established with local support.4 Effective en-
forcement cannot be imposed from the outside.
Unfortunately, the debate over drug patents in poor countries has
become very polarized, which makes finding an acceptable system dif-Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 93
ficult. Positions tend towards two endpoints. At one end are those who
support the current move toward a system where all countries have
the same form of intellectual property laws, and where the protection
afforded pharmaceutical inventors is at the level now available in the
developed countries. At the other end are those who view the higher
prices sustained by pharmaceutical patents as too burdensome in poor
countries and advocate either no patents for drugs in the developing
world or expansive compulsory licensing provisions.
Any policy discussion in this area should start from the recognition
that granting inventors intellectual property rights inevitably entails a
trade-off. Not, as it is sometimes cast, between corporate profits and
public health. Rather, between two equally important public health
goals: widespread access to existing drugs and the maintenance of in-
centives to create new ones. The higher prices sustained by patents
finance the search for new innovations, but higher prices also mean
that fewer consumers can purchase goods incorporating those innova-
tions.5 Whether an extension of patent rights is desirable depends im-
portantly upon the extent to which the prospect of greater profits leads
firms to increase research investment, and the degree to which each
additional dollar of investment results in beneficial innovation. These
both decline at higher levels of R&D investment.6 As a result, one can
expect more benefit from increasing protection where incentives are
initially low.
In light of this, one of the strongest arguments of the pharmaceutical
industry when advocating the adoption of strong patent systems in the
developing world has been the claim that the availability of patent
rights there would encourage more private investment in products
tailored to the specific needs of poor countries. There is a substantial
list of "neglected diseases" that are prevalent in poor countries and
almost absent in rich countries. These have few, if any, effective treat-
ments and have seen almost no investment by the private sector and
little by the public sector. It is hard to disagree that pharmaceutical pol-
icy targeting such diseases should focus primarily on attracting more
researchproducts must exist before they can be made available.7
Two questions are raised by industry's argument, however. First, is
it important that private firms be involved in the search for new prod-
ucts? And, if the answer is yes, should the availability of patent protec-
tion in the developing world be part of the incentive established to
encourage their involvement?94 Lanjouw
Industry's argument highlights a more general pointthat there are
two extremely different types of drug markets. Their argument focuses
on diseases specific to developing countries, and for those it has most
merit. However, there are many global diseases that are widespread in
poor countries and also in rich countries. Because drugs to prevent and
treat global diseases already enjoy large western markets, the trade-
offs associated with the extension of patent rights to poor countries
look very different for such drugs. While it may be important to ensure
inventors protection in poor countries to increase malaria research, it
is less obvious that it is good policy to encourage cancer research in
this way. Drug markets differ, and as a result the optimal geographic
extent of protection for pharmaceutical innovations also differs across
diseases.
This chapter considers some of the arguments for the extension of
pharmaceutical product patents in poor countries. The following sec-
tion discusses the basic justification for granting patent rights and for
placing limits on them. Section III considers products for diseases pri-
marily affecting the developing world, and section IV considers prod-
ucts for global diseases. The focus for each type of disease is on the
potential effect of extended patent rights on the rate of drug innovation
and the access of the poor to existing pharmaceuticals. (Patents may
play other roles, such as facilitating contracting between firms. See Lan-
jouw 1998.) Section IV also considers the importance of patents in the
developing world as a tool to preserve incentives in developed country
markets.
Economists and policymakers have been reluctant to differentiate
protection across types of innovation despite the fact that there is often
a strong theoretical basis for doing so. In keeping with this, the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly requires nondiscrimination. There are good rea-
sons for this reluctance. The information needed to decide how best
to differentiate is limited, and any differentiation must be on features
both easily identified and hard to change or resources will be wasted
as patentees try to fit into the better class.8 Section V assesses the poten-
tial for using standard intellectual property and regulatory policies to
offer different global protection to drug innovations for the two types
of diseases. All are problematic. Section VI outlines a new mechanism
to differentiate protection that has some important advantages. With
this mechanism, protection could be allowed to continue increasing
worldwide in situations where stronger incentives to invest in research
could be importantbut delay an increase in protection in those whereIntellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 95
a marginal increase in profits would be unlikely to generate new inno-
vation. In contrast to any of the standard policy approaches, use of the
mechanism would create a global patent framework where coverage
would both adapt to the evolution of markets for different diseases
and broaden automatically to cover all pharmaceutical inventions as a
country developed. Section VII concludes.
II.The Underlying Justification for the Grant of Patent Rights
To discover and develop a new product typically costs far more than
to copy it. Thus, without some protection, entry by imitators can
quickly erode the profit available to the actual inventor. Knowing this,
potential investors will be discouraged from committing sizable sums
to research. When inventors capture only a part of the benefit to society
of their innovations, private returns do not reflect social returns and
the result is too little investment in R&D. Firms are able to protect
inventions and limit competition in a variety of ways: by keeping their
innovations secret, by taking advantage of lead time, with brand adver-
tising, and so on. However, government-granted patent rights can be
an important source of market exclusivity.9 This is particularly so for
the pharmaceutical industry because drug innovations are relatively
straightforward to imitate (Cohen, Nelson, and Strauss, 2000). On the
other hand, once a product exists welfare is best served by having it
priced close to marginal production cost. Otherwise there are consum-
ers who would be willing to pay the cost of producing the product
who do not get it (the deadweight loss). This is the cost side of supporting
research through a patent system.
The intellectual property laws in all countries recognize this inherent
trade-off in a variety of ways. It is, for example, the basis of statutory
term limits in patent law. The longer protection continues, the larger
becomes the incentive to invest in research, and on this account one
might want infinite-lived patents. However, the longer protection con-
tinues, the longer consumers must wait for competitive entry to lower
prices. At a certain point, the latter cost is viewed as outweighing the
former benefit, so the patent term is limited (for a formal analysis, see
Nordhaus 1969 and Scherer, 1972).'°
Countries also acknowledge this trade-off in their choices to limit
protection for certain types of inventions. Historically, most countries
have had very restricted protection for pharmaceutical and agriculture-
related innovations.'1 The reasons are twofold. First, patent rights in96 Lanjouw
Table 4.1
Development level on adoption of pharmaceutical product patents























a GDP is for 1992. For countries adopting after 1999 the GDP per capita figure is for 1999.
Sources: Years of adoption, Santoro (1995) and Richard Wilder (personal communica-
tion); GDP statistics, The World Bank (2001) World Development Indicators CDROM.
other countries were available to stimulate research investment. Since
they could free-ride on the products brought about by others' patents,
the benefit of increasing protection in their own markets was relatively
small. Second, because food and health are basic needs, higher prices
due to patents in these areas are more acutely felt, particularly at lower
levels of development. This also makes food and drug prices politically
sensitive. Over time, pharmaceutical protection was adopted through-
out the developed world, but only slowly. The top panel of table 4.1
presents adoption dates for many OECD countries and indicates their
GDP per capita at the time pharmaceutical protection was first offered.
Spain and Norway, for example, introduced patent protection for
pharmaceutical products only in 1992, when their GDP per capita had
Year of GDP per capita
Country adoption (1995 U.S. $)Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 97
reached $14,430 and $30,387 1995 U.s. dollars, respectively. The second
panel of the table gives the current GDP per capita of selected devel-
oping countries that have recently undertaken to introduce pharma-
ceutical product patents.
III.Developing-Country-Specific Products
The developing countries now extending protection to pharmaceutical
products are at a considerably lower level of income than those adopt-
ing earlier. This makes the policy change particularly costly for them,
since price increases matter more in poor countries. In addition to hav-
ing little income, poor consumers are rarely insured and must pay
for pharmaceuticals directly out of pocket when subsidized public
supplies are not available 12 However, there is a rationale for the de-
veloping countries to extend protection even while relatively poor,
because they do not face the same trade-offs.'3 Unlike the earlier adopt-
ers, they have pharmaceutical needs that are not shared by countries
already offering patent protection. This is for two reasons. First, they
have disease patterns that are quite distinct. For twenty diseases, at
least 99% of the global disease burden is concentrated in low- and
middle-income countries. Together these diseases are estimated to
have caused the loss of almost 200 million disability-adjusted life years
(DALYs) in 1998, and over 5 million lives, a large share of them chil-
dren.14 The A strain of the HIV virus is also particularly widespread
in poor countries but not in the developed world. HIV/AIDS is esti-
mated to have killed 2.3 million people in Africa last year (UNAIDS /
WHO 2001). For these diseases there simply is no free ride.
Second, even for a global disease like cancer, the characteristics of
some poor countries may make the many products designed for west-
ern markets unsuitable. For example, tropical countries with weak in-
frastructure need pharmaceutical products that can withstand breaks
in a distribution cold chain and survive a long shelf life. Drug discover-
ies that are very cost-effective, but less effective overall, may not be
acceptable to rich consumers and hence not developed by pharmaceuti-
cal firms even though they would be of great benefit to poor consum-
ers. The choice between vaccines and drug therapies is yet another
example. An HIV/AIDS vaccine would be far easier to deliver in a
poor country than drug therapy cocktails, but efforts to develop a
vaccine have been minimal in comparison with the investment in98 Lanjouw
treatments. Thus, even for a global disease, for which there are many
pharmaceutical products, there may be few tailored to the specific
needs of the developing world.
Little Investment and Innovation
Because serving poor consumers in the developing world is not attrac-
tive relative to their other commercial opportunities, commercial phar-
maceutical firms have directed only a minute fraction of their research
expenditure toward creating products for developing-country mar-
kets.'5 Médecins Sans Frontières (2001) report on a survey of major
drug firms conducted with the Harvard School of Public Health. Their
eleven respondents (of 20 canvassed) had a combined research expen-
diture of nearly $117 billion. Over the past year, three had invested in
drugs for leishmaniasis or Chagas disease, just two in drugs for ma-
laria, and none in drugs for African trypanosomiasis. Public sector
investment in pharmaceutical research has also been extremely low in
relation to the tremendous welfare cost of diseases primarily affecting
poor countries and the paucity of drugs to prevent and treat them.
Médecins Sans Frontières (2001) provide estimates by experts that non-
commercial research expenditure on drugs for TB, malaria, African try-
panosomiasis, and leishmaniasis combined was less than $100 million
in 2000 (which they compare with the $3.1 billion in public expenditure
devoted to cancer research in the U.S. alone). Taking public and private
expenditures together, the World Health Organization (1996) esti-
mated that, in 1992, $2.4 billion, or just 4.3% of global health-related
R&D expenditure, was related to health problems of low- and middle-
income countries.'6 Only 0.2% was spent on pneumonia, diarrheal dis-
ease, and TB, diseases that together accounted for 18% of the total
global disease burden.
Although there have been some successful public sector programs,
it is evident in the results that these limited investments have largely
failed to generate either basic innovation or products for pressing
health needs of the poor. Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001), for example,
examine basic research activity through citations in bibliometric
databases covering approximately 3900 worldwide biomedical jour-
nals. References to the set of tropical diseases (those with 99% of
their burden in poorer countries) occurred in less than l'h% of all cita-
tions in 1998. Considering patenting activity, which is more closely
linked to products, only about 1h% of all pharmaceutical patents in 1996Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 99
related to these diseases.'7 Pecoul et al. (1999) report that only eight
of 1233 drugs licensed anywhere in the world from 1975 to 1997, or
less than 1%, were developed specifically for tropical diseases in
humans (five more were for designed for veterinary uses). Médecins
Sans Frontières (2001) note that recent surveys of drugs in develop-
ment by PhRMA, the U.S. industry association, showed just two
drugs related to the most neglected diseases, of 137 medicines in the
pipeline for infectious diseases. There is considerable scope for greater
effort.
Is Engaging the Private Sector Important?
Increasing the involvement of the private sector could enlarge the pool
of resources to address specific health needs of poor countries and also
raise the productivity of public investment. The first is important be-
cause exclusive reliance on the public sectorwill almost certainly fail
to deliver substantial new investment in pharmaceuticalresearch.18 If
new funding does get allocated to healthresearch, it may only be at
the expense of other development needs with their own valid claims
to resources. Philanthropic donations, such as the $80 milliondonated
by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation over five years for pharma-
ceutical research related to malaria, TB, leishmaniasis, and African
trypanosomiasis, are a very significant contribution to the resources
available (Médecins Sans Frontières 2001). However, pharmaceutical
R&D in the private sector reached $25.7 billion in 2000 and continues
to grow.'9 Small market opportunities that shifted even a tinyfraction
of that investment in the direction of products for poor countries could
be an important boost to public and philanthropic efforts.
Irrespective of the ultimate source of research funding, new products
may be obtained more efficiently, that is, atlower cost, by engaging
the private sector. Commercial firms have financial goals, which keeps
their research programs responsive to the demands of consumers. This
is sometimes portrayed as a negative attributewhen demand is high
for solutions to dog obesity (though the blame, if any, should rest with
dog owners). But their commercial motivation has the important bene-
fit that research priorities can be directed with market signals. By con-
trast, ensuring that public sector researchers pursue programgoals
effectively requires monitoring and this can be weak. (See Kremer 2001
for a discussion of the problems encountered with public sector re-
search on vaccines.)100 Lanjouw
Pharmaceutical firms also have a comparative advantage in some
later-stage activities. They have the experience and the infrastructure
to take products through the multiple phases of clinical trials required
for approval by health authorities throughout the world. Firms have
in place marketing networks that can be used to move new products
out to doctors and patients. It is possible, and may be desirable, for
the public sector to take a few selected products from basic research
through commercialization (a vaccine, for example, where the buyers
are largely limited to governments). However, building up the public
sector capacity that would be necessary to take a broad range of new
products successfully through to commercialization would be a costly
alternative to harnessing the skills that are already available in the pri-
vate sector.
What is the Role of Patents?
It is clear that the extension of patent protection in the developing
world will not, by itself, cause private investment to pour into products
specific to their markets. Their consumers have too little purchasing
power. WHO estimates that 17 countries spent no more than $10 U.S.
per capita in 1998 on all health expenditures, not just pharmaceuticals.
Over a third of all countries spent less than $50. By contrast, twelve
countries are estimated to have spent over $2000 per capita on health
(WHO 2001).20 In fact, the industry points out that it often does not
patent in the poorest countries even when the opportunity is available,
because there is so little prospect of profit. This is supported by a report
on the patent status of 15 antiretroviral drugs in 53 African countries
in mid-2001 (Attaran and Gillespie-White, 2001). In the report a drug
is considered patented if it is protected by either a (granted) process
or product patent, or by exclusive marketing rights (an interim form
of protection allowed in the transition period established forpoor
countries under TRIPs). Outside of South Africa, where 13 of the 15
drugs had been patented, they found that patenting was very limited:
the median number of antiretrovirals under protection was just three
per country.
While industry uses this fact to stress that patents in the poorest
countries are not impeding access to drugs, it also means that pharma-
ceutical patents there are not stimulating research. More dollars are
neededpatents are clearly not sufficient.2' In policy discussions,
methods to subsidize research with public funds are often character-Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 101
ized as either push or pull mechanisms. Push mechanisms subsidize
research inputs up front, while pull mechanisms promise to pay for a
specific product with defined characteristics only once it is developed.
Kremer (2001) outlines various ways in which a pull mechanism could
be structured and provides a detailed discussion of the merits of the
two approaches in this context.
Although patents in the poor countries are not sufficient to elicit siz-
able investment in products addressing their specific needs, they may
still be desirable as part of a package of policies. A role for patents is
most obvious in conjunction with pull mechanisms designed to repli-
cate a market. These use international development funds to bolster
weak consumer purchasing power. As in a normal market, patent pro-
tection is important to ensure that original inventors can be identified
and rewarded and to prevent them from being undercut in some mar-
kets by cheaper imitations.
The role of pharmaceutical patents is less obvious with push mecha-
nisms, where public money finances research and development costs
up front. It is argued that patents would effectively make thepublic
pay twice, with firms obtaining monopoly profits anddenying to the
public use of the inventions that it has financed. However, there are
advantages. If public funding is only partial, perhaps limited to basic
research, it may be important to allow firms to garner whatever profits
are available in the market to cover development and marketing costs.
Further, uncertainty is costly. Investors require a higher return when
there is more risk. For this reason, attracting a given level of investment
from the private sector becomes more costly when firms are unsure of
the rights they will hold at the end of the research process. The avail-
ability of patent rights, and clear rules about how they will be inter-
preted, can reduce uncertainty by defining ownership rights in a way
that is familiar to firms. The fact that most owners of antiretrovirals
chose to seek protection in (much richer) South Africa clearly shows
that firms do want to establish their rights as soon as a potential market
appears.
Deciding the appropriate bounds on intellectual property rights
when research is publicly funded is an issue that has been debated in
the U.S. for over a century, the topic of over forty congressional hear-
ings and reports and four special commissions between 1940 and 1975
Gaffe and Lerner 2001). Since the early 1980s, the U.S. government has
taken the position that it is important to give private researchers rela-
tively generous rights over inventions coming out of publicly funded102 Lanjouw
research programs in order to obtain the most benefit from the public
investment. With the Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments
Act of 1980, for example, the federal government allowed small busi-
nesses and nonprofit organizations to retain ownership of patents on
government-sponsored research results and to license them on an ex-
clusive basis to firms for development. Shortly thereafter this right was
extended to all government contractors, including large firms.0
It is important to recognize that the mere fact that patent rights are
available does not imply private control over innovation. Patents can
also be taken out by the government, by universities, and by interna-
tional and other organizations. If new products for poor countries'
health needs are developed within the public sector, the public sector
may hold the patents. Nor does the establishment of clear property
rights mean that they must be unconstrained. Cooperative Research
and Development Agreements (CRADAs) in the U.S., for example, are
formal contracts between government-operated laboratories and pri-
vate firms that allow cost-sharing industrial partners to own or exclu-
sively license any patented inventions that result from collaborative
research.23 This right may be limited, however, if the partner does not
meet performance benchmarks. A more targeted program is the Inter-
national AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), which seeks to coordinate
research efforts between the public sector, academia, and industry. In-
dustry partners hold the patent rights for the exclusive marketing of
any vaccines developed, subject to the condition that patented vaccines
will be sold to the governments of developing countries at "affordable
prices." Failing that, IAVI obtains the right to license the patent to an
alternative producer on a nonexclusive basis for this (limited) purpose
(United Nations Development Programme, 2001). Under Bayh-Dole,
the U.S. Federal Government retains march-in rights to revoke owner-
ship and licensing privileges if an invention is not developed and made
available on reasonable terms to the public.
Of course, any limitations on patent rights need to be well defined in
advance or the benefits of clarity are lost. In hearings before Congress
concerning Bahy-Dole, industry objected to vagueness in the terms,
insisting that government only be able to use its march-in rights "..
after a full and complete hearing before an impartial arbiter based on
clear and convincing evidence....Likewise, the circumstances under
which the rights can be exercised must be precisely defined and avoid
such vague terms as 'welfare' and the like." (quoted in Arno and Davis
2001). Limitations also must be enforced. Arno and Davis (2001) pointIntellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 103
to government's failure to set up an administrative process thatwould
allow it to exercise its march-in rights effectively. (See also their op-ed
in the Washington Post, March 27, 2002.)
The Bayh-Dole Act and related legislation appear to have had the
desired effect. Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) report that the number of
universities with technology licensing and transfer offices increased
from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990, and licensing royalties almost doubled
between 1991 and 1994. Thus, the incentive given to university admin-
istrators to find technology buyers seems to have successfully in-
creased the commercial use of government-funded academic research
output. Similarly, Jaffe and Lerner (2001) find a strong increase in pat-
enting by U.S. national laboratories after the passage of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, legislation intended to
encourage greater technology transfer from thelaboratories.24
Patents Also Encourage "Low Profile" Innovations
A publicly funded research program, whether push or pull, needs to
have clear and limited objectives. Public and philanthropic efforts natu-
rally focus on major pharmaceutical needs. As discussed, patent rights
can contribute to the success of thesetargeted projects. A further ad-
vantage to having patents available in the developing world is easily
overlooked. Without direction or control, patents engage numerous in-
dependent entities in the search to find new or adapted products for
any purpose that might offer some return.Most of these products
would not, individually, be significant enough to attract public atten-
tion and resources. However, by their sheer number they could, taken
together, be of considerable value to poor consumers. Just to give some
perspective, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted over
10,000 patents related to pharmaceuticals in 1998 alone; and in 2000
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved about 750
different drug and blood-related products. It would be completely in-
feasible to set up research programs to target the range of products
that might find a small but profitable market in the developing world.
In sum, the primary issue for pharmaceutical policy related to devel-
oping-country-specific health needs is to increase the level of invest-
ment in the discovery and development of new products. Market
incentives have been largely missing, both because people in the devel-
oping world are poor and because intellectual property rights for drugs
there have been very circumscribed. Stronger patent rights alone may104 Lanjouw
encourage firms to make small investments to find new products or
adapt existing pharmaceuticals to poor-country needs. These new in-
vestments will not be substantial, of course, unless there is also an
increase in funding. The availability of (possibly limited) clear and reli-
able patent rights in poor countries could complement policies to stim-
ulate research with public funding. Pull mechanisms that would
replicate a market, for example, are assumed to utilize an existing pat-
ent system. These have been receiving considerable attention recently.
Similarly, patent rights may contribute to the productivity of direct
public research funding (push) by lowering the risk associated with
investing in this area and encouraging industry involvement. Thus,
for developing-country-specific needs, where the creation of stronger
incentives to discover and develop new pharmaceuticals is of para-
mount importance, there is a rationale for poor countries to have pat-
ents in place.
IV.Global Diseases
Consider now global diseases. Although this class of diseases has re-
ceived less attention in development debates over intellectual property,
they are also an important and growing source of disability and mortal-
ity among the poor. Cancer, heart disease, and diabetes, for example,
already account for 16% of all DALYs lost in low- and middle-income
countries, a group having a weighted average GDP per capita of $1250.
This is four times the share lost to malaria (WHO 1999). An Economist
report on recent research into the rapid rise in obesity in poor countries
emphasizes that it will have a dramatic effect on disease patterns and
the incidence of diet-related noncommunicable diseases. They report,
for example, that the number of new cases of adult-onset diabetes in
China and India already exceeds the number of new cases in the rest
of the world combined (The Economist, February 23, 2002).26
While global diseases impose major suffering on the poor, their low
purchasing power means that consumers in poor countries represent
a very small part of the total market for drugs for global diseases. For
example, about 46% of the world's population is found in countiies rep-
resenting less than 2% of total expenditure on drugs for cardiovascular
disease. As another example, countries with GDP per capita less than
$2500 together contributed less than 'h% to global spending on antiret-
roviral drugs in 1999 [IMS and World Bank (1999) data, own calculation;
see Lanjouw (2002a) for further evidence]. Thus, for the same reasonIntellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 105
that patents in poor countries wifi not, by themselves, encourage much
private research on developing-country-specific diseases, they create al-
most no additional stimulus to research on global diseases.
It was argued in the previous section that, in spite of the weak incen-
tives generated by patents in poor countries, pharmaceutical patents
might nevertheless be valuable in those areas of research for which the
developing world is the primary market. One might also argue that
there is underinvestment in all areas of pharmaceutical research and
that therefore increasing the geographic reach of patent protection
would be desirable even for global-disease products with profitable
markets in rich countries. But this is less convincing. Once there are
pharmaceuticals available to treat a disease, the consumer benefit of
additional research begins to fall. It is well documented that diseases
with large markets call forth large amounts of duplicative research. A
study of 775 new chemical entities (NCEs) introduced into the world
during the period 1975-1989, for example, reports that a group of ex-
perts rated only 95 as truly innovative (Barral 1990). Morerecently, the
U.S. FDA considered fewer than half of the new molecular entities it
approved during 1998-2001 to be significant improvements over al-
ready marketed products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention
of a disease.27 If, nevertheless, one wants to use the patent system to
marginally increase research on global diseases, there remain a wide
variety of options. For example, the statutory term of protection in rich
countries could be extended by a month or two. Introducing new pat-
ent rights in the poor countries is not clearly the best ofthose options.
In fact, no one who advocates that pharmaceutical patents be ex-
tended in poor countries suggests that it is because there is insufficient
investment in cancer research. Two other arguments are proffered in
relation to global diseases. The first is that innovating firms will be
slow to launch their new products in poor countries without protection
there. Patents would speed the arrival of new pharmaceuticals. There
is no clear evidence to support this view. The second is that they will
help protect rich-country markets that are increasingly at risk from
"flowback." This argument has merit, but alternative policies to attain
the same end have advantages.
Patents to Speed Product Introductions
Obtaining marketing approval and educating doctors about a new
drug requires a sizable investment. Absent patent protection, entrants106 Lanjouw
can free-ride on the introductory marketing efforts of the first firm and
make its expenditure on the initial launch unprofitable. This argument
in favor of product patents was heard in the leadup to TRIPS, and
support for it was drawn from evidence that many drugs are not avail-
able in developing countries. However, this may not be due to a lack
of patent protection. Other legal features, such as inappropriate regula-
tory procedures, may limit pharmaceutical introductions in poor coun-
tries (Kremer 2002), and price controls may also discourage market
entry. To put this evidence in context it is also useful to consider again
the study by Barral (1990). Of the 95 NCEs classified as innovative, he
found that 31% were being marketed in no more than five of the seven
largest pharmaceutical markets.28 In other words, even among new
drugs deemed to offer a therapeutic advantage, a significant portion
were not introduced by the patentee in developed-country markets
protected by product patents.
It is also not necessary that a country rely on the innovating firm
to introduce new drugs. In the absence of patent protection, generics
manufacturers or firms in developing countries are also able to enter
the market. The latter have shown themselves to be adept at rapid imi-
tation and willing to incur the costs of launching new products. Over
the past two decades, for example, copies of major patented drugs typi-
cally arrived on the Indian market within seven years of their world
launchoften much earlierand the speed of imitation appears to
have increased (Lanjouw 1998, Watal 2000). For ten drugs launched in
the U.S. after 1985, Watal finds an average time lag to availability in
India of just two years. The U.K. multinational Glaxo faced several local
competitors from the first day that its subsidiary marketed its proprie-
tary drug ranitadine (Zantac) in India.
Granting protection may speed the arrival of new drugs on the mar-
ket by making the process of adapting a product, getting marketing
approval, and introducing it to consumers profitable. However, giving
patentees control over drug introductions may actually slow down
diffusion. A multinational with a newly patented drug may delay
launches in poor countries because of concerns over global price regu-
lations (see below). For example, Bayer chose not to introduce its pat-
ented drug ciprofloxacin in India because it would have had to sell
it at what Bayer viewed as, at that time, too low of a price. Instead,
ciprofloxacin was introduced three years after its world launch by the
Indian firm Ranbaxy. In 1996, more than eight years after its world
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Bayer also began marketing ciprofloxacin in India (interview with
Bayer executive, India, 1997). If patentees hesitate to introduce drugs
at low prices in the initial years of global marketing, and with imitators
prevented from entering, innovative pharmaceuticals may actually be-
come available in poor countries more slowly than they would have
in the absence of protection.
Patents to Prevent Damage to Rich-Country Markets
The more recent argument suggesting that poor countries should ex-
tend their patent laws to include pharmaceutical products even for
global diseases does not relate to them directly, nor to profit opportuni-
ties in their markets. It is argued that if innovating firms are not al-
lowed control over the global distribution of their products, then they
will be unable to protect their primary sales base in the rich countries.
This is important. If generic competition in poor countries erodes
profits in the rich countries, it could significantly dampen research in-
centives and slow the creation of new products. On that account, con-
sumers in all parts of the world would be harmed.
There are two ways in which profit erosion might occur. The most
important is due to cross-country price comparisons. Consumers in
rich countries object to paying higher prices than they see being
charged to consumers in other countries and put pressure on compa-
nies, through their representatives in government, to lower prices. This
has been seen most recently in the furor over lower Canadian prices
for patented products and the passage of legislation (subsequently sus-
pended) to allow the reimport of certain drugs into the U.S.29 It does
not always help that the other countries are poor. A disheartening ex-
ample is that of the UNICEF vaccine program. Prior to 1982, European
and American manufacturers bid to supply UNICEF with vaccines for
poor countries at low prices. "In congressional hearings in 1982 con-
cerning federal and state expenditures for the purchase of children's
vaccines ... the U.S.vaccine industry was savaged for allegedly subsi-
dizing vaccines for the poor children of the world by charging high
costs to U.S. families and taxpayers" (Institute of Medicine 1997; em-
phasis mine). Regulatory systems can reinforce political pressures.
Drug prices in developed countries are increasingly regulated on the
basis of global reference pricing, a system in which the price ceiling
allowed for a new drug is linked to the price charged by the patentee
elsewhere.3°108 Lanjouw
Whether comparisons are made by consumers or by government
regulators, the problem is most acute when a patent-owning firm itself
markets its product in poor countries at lower prices. Competitive pric-
ing by imitating firms reveals some information about marginal pro-
duction costs that could be used to pressure the innovating firm.
However, imitators' products could be presented as having quality or
other characteristics justifying a difference in price.
Although the examples above indicate that consumers have been
sensitive to price, it is also the case that patentees have launched their
patented products in countries that did not offer them protection at
very substantially lower prices without attracting attention. Until the
anthrax scare in October 2001, the drug recommended to combat the
disease, ciprofloxacin, was being sold by the patent owner, Bayer, in
the U.S. at a wholesale price of about $4.60 for a 500-mg tablet and at
a Federal Government price of $1.83. Meanwhile, it was being mar-
keted in India by 78 firms, including Bayer, for about 10 cents a tablet
(Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2001). Similarly, the antiulcer drug Zan-
tac was being sold by the patentee, Glaxo, at about $2.80 for 300 mg
in the U.S. at the time of patent expiration in early 1996. At the same
time, Glaxo sold the same product in India under the brand name Zin-
tec for less than 6 cents. Another antiulcer medication, Tagamet, was
sold by the patent owner at about $2.25 for 800 mg in the U.S. at the
time of patent expiration and was sold for about 11 cents in India by
Cadila Healthcare, among others (Bemdt, Ling, and Kyle 2000, Indian
Pharmaceutical Guide 1996).
The second way in which competitive production in developing coun-
tries could erode profits in rich countries is if drugs sold cheaply in one
country were exported into higher-priced markets. In most cases such
movements are ifiegal because patents in the rich countries give owners
the right to prevent imports. The U.S. and the European Union, for exam-
ple, restrict the import of a patented product even when the first sale of
that product abroad was by the patentholder, his licensee or subsidiary.31
The issue here, then, is the abffity to enforce existing rights to prevent
infringing imports. The extensive regulation of rich-country pharmaceu-
tical markets makes hidden imports in bulk difficult, and again empirical
evidence that this has been a significant problem is limited.
Going Forward
Now, the world may be changing in ways that will make it more diffi-
cult for pharmaceutical firms to separate their rich- and poor-countryIntellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Comtries 109
markets. The high-profile scrutiny of the cost of antiretroviral drugs
has drawn public attention to cross-country price differences that en-
compass the developing world. This attention is the result of both the
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis created by AIDS and related con-
flicts over TRIPS implementation.32 Multinationals have already indi-
cated that they may withdraw from research on antiretrovirals because
of the pricing constraints this attention puts them under.33 Public atten-
tion may diminish with time, particularly if pricing issues related to
antiretrovirals are resolved, but it may well be a continuing feature of
the political environment in which firms must operate.
Further, with the rapid growth of the Internet and online pharmac-
ies, it will become increasingly difficult to control the physical move-
ment of products. Once developing-country firms have developed
sufficient reputations for quality, one can easily imagine hundreds of
thousands of packets crossing borders by mail. Patentees will be hard
pressed to identify such individual infringements and reluctant to sue
their customers. Internet sales also pose a safety threat to consumers.
In a statement to the U.S. Congress on May 25, 2000, a commissioner
of the U.S. FDA stated that "Internet technology can obscure the source
of the product. ... [Theagency] believes that illegal online drug sales
pose a significant public health risk. ...The sale of drugs to U.S. resi-
dents via foreign websites is an extremely challenging area." (Hubbard
2000.)
Policy Response
Is the extension of pharmaceutical patent protection to poor countries
a good policy response to potential price erosion in rich-country mar-
kets? Global patent rights will only help innovative firms deal with
consumers' sensitivity to differences in prices if they use the control
that patents give them to price fairly uniformly across countries. If
firms set uniform prices, these prices will reflect demand conditions in
the major, rich-country markets. As a solution to the problem of cross-
country price comparisons, this approach would clearly be extremely
damaging to the poor. A more appropriate alternative, though difficult,
would be to educate consumers in the rich countries about the reasons
for price differences and to develop domestic policies aimed at making
pharmaceutical prices a less politically sensitive issue.
Global protection of their patented products would give owners bet-
ter control over their physical movement. Firms would be able to moni-
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infringing exports to other markets. Allowing them this control could
beneficially lower the overall resources devoted to enforcement and
make patents in the developed world more effective. If the concern
were the physical movement of products rather than consumer price
sensitivity, patentees could adhere to marginal-cost pricing in the de-
veloping world. However, this is not where their incentives naturally
lie, and as a result such a system would require constant monitoring.
Oxfam, one of the major NGO campaigners for lower drug prices, says:
"Although an equitable pricing system [by firms with the WHO] makes
drugs cheaper in poor countries, it should be seen as a complement to
the policy of maintaining a low level of patent protection in poor coun-
tries and letting generic competition reduce prices. Equitable pricing
does pose a significant administrative challenge, which simply does not
arise with the market-based approach." (Oxfam 2001a; italics mine.)
Again there are alternative policies for addressing the problem. For
example, developing countries can improve export controls, require
manufacturers to record supplies so that total sales can be monitored,
and require drugs to be colored and packaged so as to make their loca-
tion of origin more apparent. Note that all of these, including the last,
require the cooperation of poor-country governments to resolve a prob-
lem that is primarily of concern to rich-country consumers and firms.
This could be part of a general agreement on a revised patent framework that
would benefit firms and consumers in both rich and poor countries.
V. Avenues to Differentiated Patent Protection
The previous sections have suggested that the optimal global frame-
work for pharmaceutical patents might require differentiating the ef-
fective protection given to products in accordance with their extremely
different global markets. Patents in poor countries will be a more valu-
able stimulus to innovation in therapeutic areas where their consumers
are the major market. Several standard intellectual property and regu-
latory mechanisms could be considered for this purpose. First, poor
countries could directly legislate that pharmaceutical innovations re-
lated to a list of global diseases are not patentable. Second, most coun-
tries, rich and poor, regulate pharmaceutical prices, and this is not
restricted by treaty. Thus countries could grant patent rights on all
drug products but use price control regulations to differentiate the
value of those patent rights. Third, and more controversially, the TRIPs
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lic health goals. Compulsory licenses are nonexclusive licenses to use
a protected innovation in return for reasonable royalty payments to
the patentee. As with price control, higher "reasonable royalties" could
be paid on drug product innovations of particular interest in devel-
oping countries. We assess each of these options in turn.
Selective Patentability
There is precedent for simply stating that pharmaceutical innovations
related to certain diseases are not patentable. Previous to the TRIPS
Agreement, Cartagena Agreement membersBolivia, Colombia, Peru,
and Venezuelaexcluded products on the WHO essential drugs list
from patentability. This approach is appealingly straightforward.
Note that, at the time of application, the information needed to dif-
ferentiate across innovations by disease is not available in any practical
sense. The therapeutic uses of an innovation would be difficult to glean
from its patent specification. Often the uses of a pharmaceutical prod-
uct are only discovered after considerable time has passed. Because of
the difficulty in making a determination at grant, in practice all phar-
maceutical products would be treated as though they were patentable,
and the issue of invalidity on the grounds of a particular pharmaceuti-
cal use would be addressed in subsequent litigation, if at all. This has
the advantage that in many cases no resources would be expended on
classifying different patents or patented products.
Although it appears the most straightforward way to differentiate
protection, selective patentability does have some major drawbacks.
Most importantly, at this time such a restriction would be incompatible
with the existing treaty agreement. Article 27.1 of TRIPS states". .. pat-
ents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimina-
tion as to the place of invention, the field of technology arid whether
products are imported or locally produced." Although several explicit
exemptions are listed, any policy that directly differentiates legal treat-
ment across diseases is in certain conflict with TRIPs and would require
treaty renegotiation. As agreements, even partial ones, in this area have
been reached only after intense negotiations and with great difficulty,
this is a serious issue.
It would be necessary to determine a clear and reliable way to iden-
tify nonpatentable products should litigation arise. If there were any
ambiguity, considerable resources could be devoted by both sides in an
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competitive entry could be deterred altogether by the prospect of high
legal costs, even when the patents protecting a product are invalid.
Finally, any policy that gives differential patent treatment to thera-
pies for some diseases will affect patient groups differently. As a result,
domestic political pressure would almost surely make differentiation
along the lines required (that is, exempting from protection only global
disease products) untenable. Any differentiation would more likely re-
flect the relative strength of domestic patient lobby groups or the par-
ticular pressures brought to bear by firms. One could isolate the policy
from continuing political pressures by making it difficult to change the
type of product innovations deemed nonpatentable, perhaps stating
them specifically in the patent law. But to the extent that this is success-
ful, the policy becomes inflexible in the face of changes in product mar-
kets.
Price Control Regulation
Rather than approaching differentiation through the intellectual prop-
erty system, a price control regime could be designed to have a similar
effect. Products treating global diseases could be put under very strict
control, and those treating diseases found primarily in poor countries
could be allowed higher price-cost margins.
There are two major advantages associated with this approach. First,
it does not require any modification of TRIPs. The strengthening of
worldwide intellectual property protection could continue for all phar-
maceutical products as required by treaty. Second, price control regula-
tion is already a feature of the pharmaceutical markets in both rich and
poor countries. Hence, although firms may not be happy about it, the
principle of regulating prices is not likely to be challenged in the inter-
national arena.
However, there is an important drawback to relying on regulation
to keep down prices when patent rights are strong. Patentees would
retain control over sales in the developing-country market and could,
if controlled prices were viewed as too low, simply keep patented
products off the market altogether. This is not hypothetical. Recently
the head of Pfizer announced that it would threaten to withhold new
treatments from France unless the government would allow higher
drug prices. Further, he claimed that many other countries could see
access withdrawn, and the CEO of AstraZeneca is quoted as saying "I
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to launch products" (Financial Times, December 10, 2001). Thus price
control can only ensure low priced access if the government is able to
license others to work the patent in response to a refusal by the paten-
tee to supply the market. Under current rules, a refusal to supply might
be sufficient to trigger the national emergency provisions allowing
compulsory licensing. However, even if so, one would first see drawn-
out negotiations over price and then over reasonable royalties and
other suppliers would need to be found quickly for licensing to be
effective. This process could cause considerable delay, particularly in
those countries with weak regulatory capabilitythat is, the poorest.
Regulating through price controls rather than competition has the
further drawback that it demands continuous monitoring to ensure
that any price ceilings imposed are not evaded by manufacturers or
retailers. This is also particularly difficult in countries with limited reg-
ulatory capability. Articles have been written in India, for example,
pointing to evasion of price controls in that country (Rane 1995).
Finally, this approach shares with the previous one the information
and political problems associated with differentiating protection. In
this case the price control board would have to identify the diseases
each product could treat and determine if they were on a global disease
list. It would be simpler than the problem faced by a patent examiner
since this determination would only need to be made at the time of
marketing, when information from the marketing approvals process
might be available to inform the decision. However, the political diffi-
culties would be more acute when using price regulation. Because of
the clear link between the ongoing decisions made by regulators and
the prices faced by consumers, a price control board would be a obvi-
ous target for dissatisfied patient groups.
Compulsory Licensing
The TRIPS agreement puts various conditions on the use of compul-
sory licenses. These conditions were purposefully left vague in the
treaty because of lack of agreement. They continue to be contentious.
Their clarification was an item that the WTO Ministerial Conference
returned to in its "Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public
Health" made in November 2001. The procedural conditions required
for licensing stated in TRIPs include: treating each license request on
its individual merits; considering a compulsory license only after nego-
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subjected to independent review. However, situations of national
emergency allow the override of these procedural conditions so as to
allow countries rapid access to treatments. Remaining points of dis-
agreement related to use of compulsory licensing are outlined in detail
in Abbott (2002b).
Compulsory licensing in order to allow competition to lower prices
avoids delays due to protracted negotiations between the government
and patentees over the level of controlled prices. Because of the proce-
dural conditions, however, reliance on a compulsory license system
could also entail substantial delay in new drugs' arrival on the market.
Firms considering competitive entry will not begin to make the re-
quired investments until they know that they will be able to proceed
with production and sales. For this reason, Scherer and Watal (2001),
in a discussion of compulsory licensing experience, commend the ap-
proach that was taken by the Canadians, who set 4% as the reasonable
royalty payment for all such licenses. By doing this, the licensing board
avoided having to investigate R&D costs and market conditions before
setting each fee. The average licensing approval time of only 10 months
was possible precisely because no attempt was made to differentiate
across products.
The TRIPS agreement also creates two problems for differentiating
through licensing. As with selective patentability, a compulsory licens-
ing scheme that differentiated treatment across pharmaceutical innova-
tions on the basis of diseases treated would run counter to Article 27.1
of TRIPs. Further, patentees given lower royalty rates on this basis
could well argue that this was not "reasonable."34 Again, a treaty
amendment would be needed to allow this form of discrimination. Sec-
ond, as the TRIPs agreement now stands, firms are limited in their
ability to produce for export under a compulsory license. Since this
means that there would be no source of imports, compulsory licensing
would only be effective in countries with manufacturing capacity. This
issue was raised at the WTO Ministerial Conference. It was not re-
solved there, although the TRIPS Council was instructed to furnish a
proposal regarding export under compulsory license by the end of
2002.
As with price control, under a differentiated compulsory licensing
scheme the correct allocation of every patented product would have
to be determined, with firms' having every incentive to make this as
hard as possible. In order to differentiate effectively, one would need
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and then have a quick method for identifying the category into which
a particular product should fall. This would be both difficult and costly.
Beyond the informational problem, the more difficult aspect of li-
censing products for different types of diseases differently again might
be political. Having seen a compulsory license granted for a global dis-
ease product with a "reasonable royalty" of 1%, those suffering from
malaria might well object to a "reasonable royalty" of 30% or 50% being
required of producers of their drugs, regardless of the justification.
VI. A New Mechanism for Differentiating Protection
We have seen that each of the standard intellectual property and regu-
latory policies that might be used to differentiate protection has very
significant drawbacks. This section describes a new mechanism that
would make differential protection a more feasible policy option. The
mechanism effectively requires patent owners to choose either protec-
tion in the rich countries or protection in the poor countries (but not
both), whenever they have a pharmaceutical innovation related to a
listed global disease. Given this choice, such patentees would chose to
maintain protection in rich-country markets and allow competition in
the poor countries. Owners of patents related to nonglobal diseases, on
the other hand, would be allowed protection worldwide. This section
briefly describes the policy from the perspective of U.S. law, followed
by a discussion of coordinated implementation across countries. Legal
details, including a discussion of TRIPS compatibility, are in Lanjouw
(2002b).
The Mechanism
For simplicity first assume that there are: two countries, the U.S. and
India; two diseases, cancer representing global diseases and malaria
representing all others; and three companies, PharmaUS, Ciplalndia,
USGeneric, each representing a type of firm. The basis of the mecha-
nism is the obligation in U.S. law that the inventor must applyfirst for a
U.S. patent when an innovation is made in the U.S. To make subsequent
applications abroad the inventor requires aforeign filing license from the
U.S. PTO. Specifically, U.S. law provides that "{e]xcept when author-
ized by a license obtained from the Commissioner of Patents a person
shall not file or cause or authorize to be filed in any foreign country
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patent or for the registration of a utility model, industrial design, or
model in respect of an invention made in this country." (35 U.S.C. §184).
This domestic filing requirement is in place for the purpose of national
security. Failure to obtain the license before a foreign filing renders the
U.S. patent invalid.
The policy is to stipulate that, when a patentee petitions for this li-
cense, he does so in something like the following form:
I, the undersigned, request a license to make foreign patent filings covering
the invention described in U.S. patent application no. X, with the understand-
ing that this permission wifi not be used to restrict the sale or manufacture of
drugs for cancer in India by suing for patent infringement in India.
Basic Outline of Why It Works
Suppose that PharmaUS has a cancer product protected by a single
patent in the U.S. and in India. The company obtains marketing ap-
proval in both countries and sells the product. Now Ciplalndia (or
USGeneric) enters the Indian market with its own version of the same
product. PharmaUS can choose one of three strategies:
Continue to sell the product. Making this choice, the firm would need
to lower its price to remain competitive with new entrants. PharmaUS
would then obtain no benefit from its Indian patent.
Exit. PharmaUS might be uncomfortable selling at prices low enough
to be competitive in India and thus might choose to withdraw from
the Indian market. With this choice, PharmaUS would continue to exer-
cise its rights in the U.S. market, while the Indian market would be
served by other manufacturers.
Sue for infringement. The company has a valid patent in India. Noth-
ing prevents the company from choosing to protect its rights in India,
on the basis of its patent there, in an Indian court. If it does so, how-
ever, either Ciplalndia or, more likely, USGeneric, can claim in a U.S.
court that, by attempting to stop sales of the cancer product in India,
PharmaUS has rendered its U.S. patent unenforceable. This is so be-
cause, by taking this action, PharmaUS has falsified the declaration it
made to the U.S. PTO to obtain the foreign ffling license. Patentees have
a general duty to deal with the patent office in good faith, and failure
in this regard is grounds for rendering a patent unenforceable.
Suppose now that the innovation had been for a malaria product.
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with the entry of Ciplalndia. Again its third option is to sue for in-
fringement. Now, however, the suit would give no grounds for render-
ing the U.S. patent unenforceable. The declaration made by PharmaUS
to obtain its foreign filing license says nothing about malaria.
Thus, in the case of a patent for a cancer product, PharmaUS's two
choices are effectively between protecting its profits in the U.S. and
protecting them in Indiabut not bothas desired. The key point is
that the firm will not sue in India for infringements of cancer product
patents, because it will not want to jeopardize its U.S. patents. Knowing
this, Ciplalndia will enter the market, and prices in India will fall. With
a malaria product, PharmaUS will prosecute infringements in India
and therefore has effective protection in both the U.S. and India. Thus
incentives for investment in malaria products are maintained.
What Is a Cancer Product?
A clear procedure is needed to determine when an Indian product cor-
responds to a particular disease. One possibility is the following. All
products marketed in the U.S. are approved for specific indications.
To render unenforceable PharmaUS's patent, Ciplalndia or USGeneric
could be required to take the Indian product and apply to the U.S. FDA
for an abbreviated new-drug approval. The applicant would claim the
Indian product's equivalence to one already marketed in the U.S. with
a cancer indication. The procedure would be precisely the same as that
already followed for any generic on the expiry of a patented product.
The case that the Indian product is for cancer would be made with the
issuance of a U.S. FDA report confirming bioequivalence.
Procedure to Determine Content of Declaration
Above we assumed that there is a single poor country, India, and a
single disease with a predominantly rich-country market, cancer. The
declaration would, in fact, specify lists of countries and lists of diseases.
A straightforward, transparent, and objective procedure is needed to
determine these lists. The patent office would update the license decla-
ration periodicallysay every two yearsfollowing the stated proce-
dure, and would not need to make any judgments of its own about
the content of the declaration.
Before discussing how to specify these sets, it is important to em-
phasize why we would not want to simply pick the poorest countries118 Lanjouw
and then apply the policy to all diseases. If we were to do so, the de-
sign of the mechanism would ensure that firms' own choices would
automatically keep incentives roughly in order. For products where
potential profits were greater in the U.S., patentholders would re-
frain from enforcing Indian patents. For products more valuable in
India they would choose to prosecute infringements there and give
up the U.S. market. Thus, responding on the basis of their knowledge
of global market opportunities, firms' behavior would reflect the
relative demand for new products, as one would want. The problem
is that, when a product has a market that is fairly evenly spread ac-
ross the two countries, allowing the innovating firm protection in
one just country or the other would have a substantial effect on its
profits. Thus, to maintain research incentives the declaration should
be limited to diseases with markets that are concentrated in the rich
countries. A procedure is needed to determine which diseases these
are.
Starting with a group of poor countries, the goal is to identify those
diseases where the potential profit coming from sales in that group of
countries is less than, say, 2% of global profits. A practical approach
would be to set up a procedure with two steps, the first identifying
increasingly broad groups of poor countries, and the second, appro-
priate diseases for each group. An example would be the following:
Step 1. Ask countries with GDP less than $5000 per capita whether
they object to being included in the declaration.35 Place remaining coun-
tries with GDP per capita less than $500 in group A, those with GDP
per capita less than $2000 in group B, and those with GDP per capita
less than $5000 in group C. The GDP figures to be used are the United
Nations annual statistics. (Note that the poorest countries, in group A,
are also in B and C, and so on.)
Step 2. Using data on pharmaceutical sales by disease class, calculate,
for each class, total world sales and then sales in each of the country
groups A, B, and C. Include on disease list A all classes where the sales
for country group A are less than 2% of world sales, and similarly for
disease lists B and C. (See Lanjouw 2002a for a discussion of data and
the use of sales information as a proxy for profits.)
For the poorest of poor countries, of group A, probably all disease
classes would qualify and, effectively, no protection would be afforded
pharmaceuticals in those countries. Moving to B, the group gets larger
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and patent protection would be available on those. For the largest
group C, yet fewer diseases would qualify, and the scope of protection
would widen further. Once a country attained a GDP per capita greater
than $5000, protection would be available for all products.
This example is meant only to illustrate how the procedure could
be structuredother GDP cutoffs and more country groups could be
chosen. Similarly, a number other than 2% might be appropriate. In-
creasing its value would allow the policy to encompass a larger number
of diseases and confer greater price benefits on the poor, but would
begin to more significantly dampen research incentives. Structured in
this way, the procedure combines certainty with flexibility. The effec-
tive patent rights available to a firm with respect to a particular innova-
tion are determined by the content of the declaration when it is signed
at the time of patent application. These remain the same throughout
the life of the patent, and the firm can make its marketing decisions
accordingly. At the same time, the content of the declaration evolves
to reflect changes in pharmaceutical markets and the development of
countries. A country starting out in group B, for instance, would move
to group C as it grew richer and eventually would not be included in
the declaration at all.
International Coverage
The U.S. government could implement this policy on its own. Then,
however, inventions made by scientists working outside the U.S.
would not fall within its ambit. This would limit the policy's effective-
ness and is unlikely to be politically tenable. Thus, there would proba-
bly need to be coordination among countries having innovative
pharmaceutical industries.
Pharmaceutical firms tend to concentrate their research in a limited
number of centers located in developed countries. Table 4.2 gives the
nationality breakdown of inventors of U.S. pharmaceutical patents.
(This should be representative of all patenting, since innovations of
any importance would be patented the U.S.) It shows that R&D output
is highly concentrated in the U.S. and a few other countries. Thus by
far the preponderance of activity could be covered with coordination
among a limited number of governments. Implementation by eight
countries alone would cover over 90% of all pharmaceutical patents.
Of course, firms could respond by moving their research centers to
nonimplementing countries. However, firms choose their research120 Lanjouw
Table 4.2
Percentage of U.S. pharmaceutical patents and their inventors of different nationalities
Note: The nationality of a patent (the first set of columns) is the country of residence of
the first-listed inventor.
Source: Calculations by Jeffrey Furman, from U.S. PTO Technology and Assessment Fore-
casting division data, 2001. It includes all U.S. pharmaceutical patents applied for during
the period 1985-1995.
locations for a variety of reasons, arid discovery research, unlike manu-
facturing, tends to be done at a few centers. As the gains from avoiding
the policy are small, it seems highly unlikely that they would take such
action.36
Lanjouw (2002b) describes features of the intellectual property law
in the U.K., France, Germany, Canada, and Japan that are relevant to
the implementation of this policy. There are two important elements
common to the law in each of these countries. First, each of the coun-
tries has some form of national-security-related provision regarding
the treatment of patent applications. Thus their laws acknowledge that
national interests may limit the actions of patentees-in particular their
ability to disclose information. Second, in none of the countries is there
a general duty to deal in good faith with the patent office. However, in
each of them patents may be invalidated on the grounds of insufficient
disclosure-that is, when the invention is not described sufficiently
clearly and completely for someone skilled in the art to reproduce it.
Thus the basic principle that patent rights are a privilege granted by
society and may be retracted if a patentee does not fulfill requirements
designed to further social goals is there. At this time the U.K. has a
foreign-filing license obligation and procedures quite close to those in
the U.S.; Germany and France have more limited obligations but with
similar features; Japan and Canada currently place no restrictions on
foreign patent filings.
Nationality
Patents (%) Listed inventors (%)
National Cumulative National Cumulative
U.S. 50.68 50.68 42.75 42.75
Japan 11.36 62.04 17.54 60.29
Germany 9.21 71.25 12.49 72.78
U.K. 6.94 78.19 5.86 78.64
France 5.86 84.05 6.03 84.67
Switzerland 2.79 86.84 1.99 86.66
Italy 2.56 89.40 2.69 89.35
Canada 2.00 91.40 1.67 91.02Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 121
Advantages
The mechanism described may appear complicated, but its structure
confers some important advantages:
TRIPS Corn patiblityRequiring a declaration for a foreign filing license
is not de juTe discriminatory, because it is required of all patentees wish-
ing to file abroad. If you have an innovation for a drug, you would be
required to sign the declaration; if you have an innovation for a toaster
oven, you would be required to sign the declaration. It is, of course,
de facto discriminatory, since that is the intention. However, de facto
discrimination has not been ruled incompatible with the TRIPS
agreement (see Lanjouw 2002b for further discussion). As a result, no
amendment to TRIPs would be required using this approach.
Information A major advantage of this policy is that it does not require
information that is expensive to obtain. The mechanism is triggered by
a lawsuit. An important reason for this feature is that when an infringe-
ment suit is filed to prevent the sale of a product, it is on the basis of
a set of patents. In order to be successful in prosecuting its suit, the
patent-owning firm has a strong incentive to correctly identify the pat-
ents it believes best protect the product in question. This resolves the
otherwise intractable problem of how to identify the therapeutic use
of innovations described in patent specifications. As noted above, in
practice selective patentability would operate in the same mariner, with
invalidity only assessed as part of a suit. The important difference is
that here the patentee has a strong incentive refrain from suing when
he has no grounds, because so much is at stake (his U.S. patents). With
selective patentability the patentee has nothing to lose from filing
and prosecuting a case beyond court costs in the developing coun-
try. Therefore, with selective patentability one would expect suits and
threats of suits to be far more common.
Unlike the other alternatives, the policy makes use of firms' better
information about the relative size of markets in different countries. If
one were to simply state that innovations related to cancer were not
patentable, the restriction would apply to all cancer products. With the
policy described above, patentees would have the ability to choose the
better market, rich or poor. This would be an advantage in maintaining
incentives for research on developing country-specific diseases within
a class. Suppose, for example, that there were a rare form of cancer122 Lanjouw
only found in Africa. For products treating this form of cancer, pat-
entees would choose to protect their patents in Africa and any profits
available would be preserved.
AdministrationUnder a selective compulsory licensing or pricing
scheme the correct allocation of every patent or patented product
would have to be determined. Price control would require contin-
uous monitoring. The proposal outlined herewhere firms would
rarely trigger an event making it necessary to classify a productis
self-enforcing and only uses information easily available. As a re-
sult it would require almost no expenditure on administration or
enforcement.
TargetingClear procedures determine the country and disease groups
to go on the declaration, and the legislation to establish the procedures
is required only in the developed countries and only at the time of
implementation. This insulates the policy from lobbying by firms and
by patient groups in the developing world. With the alternatives, de-
veloping-country governments would be subject to pressures having
little to do with the underlying rationale for differentiated treatment.
VII.Conclusion
We have seen that pharmaceutical product patents promise benefits
and costs that differ with the characteristics of diseases. Building up a
stronger portfolio of products to prevent and treat diseases that primar-
ily affect poor countries will require a package of policies. Encouraging
investment by the private sector with globally available and well-
defined patent rights, together with greater financing through push
and pull mechanisms, could end the acute shortage of pharmaceutical
products for the developing world. For major global diseases, however,
the justification for extending patents in poorer countries is less clear.
Protection in rich-country markets provides enormous incentives to in-
vest in research on such diseases, incentives that dwarf any possible
contribution that would come from the developing world.37 These
products diffuse rapidly to poor countries even absent protection there.
Granting innovative firms global control over distribution in poor
countries does have some advantages in helping firms to protect
against price erosion in their major markets. However, these benefits
come at a high cost, and there are alternative ways to address the chal-Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 123
lenges of separating rich- and poor-country markets for global-disease
products. If feasible, then, the optimal framework of global patent
rights for pharmaceuticals would treat innovations differently in accor-
dance with their world markets. The benefits of patent protection could
be varied across types of drugs by defining some as nonpatentable sub-
ject matter, by selectively issuing compulsory licenses, or by controlling
certain prices more tightly. However, all of these standard approaches
have serious political, information, and enforcement problems that
would prevent them from being implemented effectively. The new
mechanism presented here, operating through a foreign-filing license
obligation, is structured to avoid these problems. It would allow the
implementation of a global patent regime that was sensitive to the de-
velopment level of countries and the characteristics of particular drug
markets.
Notes
I thank Peter Lanjouw and the editors for comments on this paper. Many people have
also contributed to the development of the new policy mechanism described in section
VI, and I greatly appreciate their time and attention. Special thanks are due to the mem-
bers of the Canadian, Japanese, U.K., French, and German patent offices who have helped
me to understand the details of their patent systems, and to Martin Adelman and Richard
Wilder for their patience in answering questions about U.S. law. Useful comments have
been received from representatives of Oxfam, the pharmaceutical industry, the U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, and from seminar participants at meetings sponsored by the
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, the Centre for Innovation Law and Policy of
the University of Toronto, New York University Law School, the NBER, CSIS, the U.S.
Treasury Department, the UNDP, the World Bank, and the WHO Commission on Macro-
economics and Health. Jeffrey Furman, Boston University, and IMS HEALTH Global
Services were generous in providing statistics.
For example, in 1984, the U.S. Congress passed a revision of the Trade and Tariff Act,
which authorized the U.S. government to take retaliatory action against countries failing
to give adequate protection to intellectual property (Section 301). The Act was strength-
ened in 1988 with legislation mandating that each year the U.S. Trade Representative
identify countries without adequate protection.
The date by which this must happen varies across countries. The least-developed
countries recently obtained an extension to 2016 of the transition period for the adoption
or enforcement of pharmaceutical product patents.
At the November 2001 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, a coalition
of sixty nations, called the Africa Group, pressed for new rules affirming the freedom
to make use of patented innovations to protect public health and for more lenient com-
pulsory licensing provisions to allow exports to countries without domestic manufactur-
ing capacity. See also Oxfam (2001a, 2001b), referring to its Cut the Cost campaign, and
issues of Access News published by Médecins Sans Frontières as part of its "Campaign
for Access to Essential Medicines.124 Lanjouw
The difficulties of establishing a well-functioning patent system are not well appreci-
ated. At the time it committed to T1UPS, for example, there were only 151 registered
patent agents in all India (Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 1996).
The business community, courts, and police all need to develop experience. A Delhi
patent attorney tells the story of an early copyright infringement case where the police
stapled confiscated CDs into a notebook, thereby destroying the evidence (interview with
Pravin Anand, 1997).
It has been suggested that innovating firms need control of sales in poor countries to
restrict the misuse and overuse of pharmaceuticals there. In this view, limiting rather than
expanding access is the objective, in which case there clearly is no trade-off associated
with patent protection. While recognizing the importance of the problem, this paper will
start from the premise that increasing access is desirable, and that pharmaceutical misuse
should be addressed by governments rather than by relying on firms to curtail usage.
In a careful statistical study of pharmaceutical research programs, Henderson and
Cockburn (1996) find sharply decreasing returns to greater investment in individual proj-
ects. They do find advantages to sizebut they come only at the level of the overall
research program.
The use of pharmaceuticals is only one way to combat disease. There are many others,
such as the provision of clean water, primary health care, education, and bednets. This
paper will treat only the role of intellectual property in improving pharmaceutical avail-
ability and not the broader issue of the relative importance of pharmaceuticals in provid-
ing better health.
The experience with "orphan" drugs illustrates. The U.S. Orphan Drug Act gives tax
benefits and exclusive marketing privileges to applicants for new-drug approvals re-
lated to products that would otherwise be uneconomic to discover and bring to market. It
identifies qualifying products as those with expected patient populations of less than
200,000. It has been suggested that industry has incorrectly obtained orphan drug
designations on more prevalent forms of cancer, AIDS, and asthma. See testimony before
the U.S. Senate by James Love at (http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/orphan/or-
phan92.html). In light of these "blockbuster orphans," Congressman Waxman, sponsor
of the original legislation, sought amendments to limit benefits for profitable orphans.
See (http: / /www.house.gov/waxman/pharm/orphan/orphan.html).
Patents grant monopoly rights over a specific innovationnot, for example, over a
therapy area. There may be intense competition between a patented product and alterna-
tive drugs or other medical treatments for a given disease (as well as competition with
other nonhealth goods that a consumer might want to purchase). What is limited is direct
imitation of the patented product.
More fundamentally, term limits demonstrate the basis of our patent laws in social
welfare rather than natural rights, since the latter should not expire.
Lerner (2002) provides a detailed account of the many other limitations placed on
patent rights by OECD countries over the past centuries.
The World Health Organization estimates that there are 28 countries where over half
of all health expenditures are covered out of pocket by individual consumers (WHO
2001).
For formal models of some of the trade-offs associated with the extension of patents
to additional countries see Deardorff (1992), Chin and Grossman (1990), and Diwan and
Rodrik (1991).Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries 125
DALYs are estimates of years of life lost or lived with a disability, adjusted for its
severity. Global burden estimates are for 1990 WHO (1996); mortality and DALY figures
are found in WHO (1999). For the disease list see Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001).
It is often suggested, incorrectly, that pharmaceutical firms located in developing
countries concentrate on diseases specific to their domestic markets. In fact they face
incentives similar to firms elsewhere. A survey of Indian firms in 1998 found that only
16% of their R&D was directed towards LDC markets (Lanjouw and Cockburn 2001).
The total includes all public health R&D (not necessarily drugs) in developing coun-
tries, plus public expenditure in developed countries on tropical or relevant vaccines,
plus any R&D expenditure, public or private, in developed countries involving collabo-
ration with an institution or scientist located in a developing country.
The data come from INPADOC and include information on patent applications and
grants from all the major patent offices in the world. Patents ified in different jurisdictions
that cover the same invention are organized into "families," which here can be thought
of as collections of all worldwide patents claiming a particular molecule. Counts of these
families thus capture patenting activity in all major patent-granting countries.
The share of real spending by the National Institutes of Health directed towards
tropical diseases, never more than 1% actually fell between 1996 and 1999 (Lanjouw and
Cockburn 2001).
PhRIvIA, 2001, "Backgrounders and Facts" at (http://www.phrma.org/publica-
tions).
Although poor countries tend to allocate a smaller share of their GDP to health,
income disparities drive these differences. If the 17 countries had devoted the same share
of GDP to health as the U.S. (12.9%), only one of them would have reached even $50
per capita in spending (compared to over $4000 for the U.S.). Some poor countries have
directed a relatively sizable share of their resources to health, but even then to little effect.
Consider: Luxembourg spent 6.0% of its GDP on health, for a per capita expenditure of
$2574. Malawi spent 7.2%, to manage a per capita expenditure of $12.
Stringent price control in a country could produce the same effect as low purchasing
power. Patent protection would not raise prices, nor would it stimulate innovation. Of
course, the policy response may be different. In the case of low incomes outside funding
is important, while in the case of price control domestic consumers may have the ability
to pay higher prices themselves.
See Eisenberg (1996) for a detailed discussion of the history of the debate.
Authorized by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986.
Other issues would enter an assessment of the benefits of these pieces of legislation.
A particular concern of observers, for example, is that allowing universities to license
their output may have a damaging effect on the open nature of university research and
on the choice of research programs.
The related drawback is that they may wastefully replicate each other's research
efforts.
Studies in Brazil, Mexico and the Dominican Republic also suggest that, as in the
developed world, obesity is more prevalent among the poorer members of society once
modest levels of income are attained.126 Lanjouw
U.s. FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, "NMEs Approved in Calender
Year " at (http: / /www.fda.gov).
The report was done in 1990, and a few of the NCEs developed towards the end of
the 1975-1989 period may have ended up being globally launched after 1990.
This was the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, also known as the Jeffords
Amendment. Oddly, the Act only concerned itself with restrictions on imports due to
FDA approval rules and ignored those derived from intellectual property. Thus, even
if it had come into force, patentees would have been able to block reimportation of their
products on the basis of their patent rights (Barton 2001). For press coverage see The
New York Times, September 27, 2000.
Although never implemented, President Clinton's 1993 Health Security Act pro-
posed using the lowest price in 22 other countries as a benchmark for determining the
reasonableness of prices set for newly introduced drugs.
That is, they restrict "parallel imports." This is not required by TRIPs, and is not the
case, for example, between the member states of the European Union.
For example, the South African government passed a law in 1997 to permit parallel
imports of H1V drugs (from lower-priced countries). It came under intense pressure from
the U.S. government to repeal the law and was subjected to a lawsuit brought by a
consortium of pharmaceutical firms. See Abbott (2002a) for details. The article "Crimes
Against Humanity" in Time Magazine, February 2001, is an example of popular press
coverage of the suffering due to H1V/AIDS.
Harvey Bale, Director General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA), pointed outlast year that the number of anti-AIDS
compounds under development had fallen for three years as a campaign against the big
companies had unfolded (Reuters, September 19, 2001). The IFPMA quotes two industry
leaders as saying that "if enthusiasm for compulsory licenses becomes great, there will
be soon no more patents on AIDS drugs to compulsorily licensebecause new prod-
uct development in this critical field will decline dramatically." (At (http: / /www.
ifpma.org).
The remuneration, according to Article 31(h), in the event a compulsory license is
granted, must "take into account the economic value of the authorization."
Domestic pharmaceutical firms in poor countries may wish to engage in cooperative
ventures with multinational companies. If the latter make the availability of domestic
patent rights a prerequisite to such interaction, and if a poor-country government views
its industry's concerns as more pressing than its consumers' interests, it might prefer
not to be on the list. Inclusion in the declaration should not be forced upon any country.
It might be relatively easy to shift activities from the U.S. to Canadaso it would
be important that Canada be an implementing country.
Glaxo-Wellcome earned an estimated profit of around 7 million dollars per day from
sales of Zantac just before patent expiry (The Economist, April 26, 1997).
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